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Abstract
Using a representative-agent life-cycle model with consumer shortsightedness, I
study an unfunded social security program nanced via consumption taxation. Com-
pared to nancing an unfunded program with payroll taxation, I nd that there is only
a slight increase in well-being across planning horizons that is generated by a program
with a consumption tax.
I acknowledge and thank T. Scott Findley for his guidance and serving as my thesis committee chairman,
James Feigenbaum and Ryan Bosworth for serving as thesis committee members.
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We suggest that both our data and the available time-series evidence are con-
sistent with Milton Friedmans view that people save to smooth consumption
over several years but, because of liquidity constraints, caution, or shortsighted-
ness do not seek to smooth consumption over longer horizons. . . . Indeed, Milton
Friedman explicitly rejected the idea that consumers had horizons as long as a
lifetime in discussing the permanent income hypothesis (Carroll and Summers
1991 pp. 307, 355).
1 Introduction
The unfunded social security program in the United States is the largest such program
in the world. It has been justied by many as: insurance against disability or premature
death; redistribution from the wealthy elderly to the poor elderly; as a replacement for failed
annuity markets; to compensate for under saving behavior. The most common justication
used is the under saving for retirement (Kotliko¤ 1982; Feldstein 1985; Docquier 2002;
·Imrohoro¼glu et al. 2003; and many others). Feldstein (1985) stated more specically, the
principal rationale for such mandatory [social security] programs is that some individuals
lack the foresight to save for their retirement years(p.303).
It is well known that the well-being of a life-cycle permanent-income consumer is reduced
by the presence of a social security program, if the program has a negative net present value.
This is due to the fact that the lifetime budget constraint is decreased. The existence of
myopic agents in a model can result in a social security program that has an optimal
tax rate greater than zero (Docquier 2002; Caliendo and Gahramanov 2009; Findley and
Caliendo 2009). The tax rate in such studies is usually set to maximize a paternalistic
social welfare function following behavioral economic practices (Akerlof 2002; Kanbur et
al. 2006). The rst study that uses a mixed economy of life-cyclers and myopic agents
to estimate an optimal social security program was Feldstein (1985). Feldstein used an
agent who exponentially discounts utility and one who does not discount in order to show
that there is an opportunity for a welfare improvement. ·Imrohoro¼glu et al. (2003) model
quasi-hyperbolic agents following Laibson (1998) and nd that in a partial-equilibrium and
general-equilibrium setting it is not welfare-improving to have a social security program.
Kumru and Thanopoulos (2008) models consumers with temptation preferences and show
that some of the welfare loss is mitigated by a social security program. The payroll-tax
2
nanced program can have an e¤ect on labor supply, causing less labor to be supplied
as demonstrated in OLG general equilibrium models (Auerbach and Kotliko¤ 1987; and
Hugget and Ventura 1999).
As an alternative to some of our proposals for benet reductions or revenue
increases, policy makers could dedicate revenue from another specic source to
Social Security (Diamond and Orszag 2005, p. 5).
As foreshadowed in the quotation above, the idea of moving towards a consumption
tax for general government expenditures has received some consideration by policy makers.
Major changes to the U.S. social security program have not been enacted since it is viewed
as politically controversial by many. To date, the majority of the consumption-tax litera-
ture is focused along two lines: using detailed taxpayer information to estimate liabilities
under current and proposed regimes; and the study of theoretical economies and the e¤ects
of policy changes inside this framework. Two studies in which a at tax was considered
as a replacement for the current U.S. tax regime were conducted by Feenberg, Mitrusi and
Poterba (1997) and Gentry and Hubbard (1997). There is no publicly available data set
containing all necessary information, hence both studies use a combination of di¤erent pub-
lic sources. Feenberg, Mitrusi and Poterba (1997) use information on income, tax liabilities
and consumption while Gentry and Hubbard (1997) us data on use data on household port-
folio choice. Feenberg, Mitrusi and Poterba (1997) nd those lower income households bear
a disproportionate share of the tax burden in comparison to the high income households.
This is in contrast to the ndings of Gentry and Hubbard (1997) who nd that the tax
liabilities could be progressive in nature, the more a­ uent in the economy bear a larger
percentage of the tax burden. Important assumptions underlying these computational stud-
ies are that aggregate quantities and factor pricing remains constant under both regimes
being considered. The line of literature which uses calibrated general-equilibrium models to
examine the di¤erences of tax liabilities under tax regime changes also exhibit mixed results
with respect to the progressivity of tax burdens. Ventrua (1999) uses an OLG model with
age and labor e¢ ciency shocks to simulate heterogeneity, and he nds that the change from
the current U.S. tax regime to a at tax results in increased concentrations of wealth. Altig
et al. (2001) compute the transition dynamics in moving from the current U.S. tax code
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to a at tax and nds that the poor are worse o¤ during the transition and in the new
steady state as compared to before the transition. Correia (2010) uses an innite-horizon
model with heterogeneity in initial wealth and income levels. She studies the renancing of
government expenditures from an income-tax regime similar to that in the U.S. to one of a
at consumption tax. She nds that well-being increases across all initial wealth levels. For
an in depth discussion of consumption taxation and optimal taxation levels, see Coleman
(2000).
The idea of nancing the social security program from alternative sources is not new.
Gahramanov and Tang (2013) use a general-equilibrium OLG model with endogenous labor
decisions and mortality risk to investigate an optimal tax policy over capital taxes, payroll
taxes, income taxes, and consumption taxes. They nd that the optimal policy to maintain
benets at current levels is to eliminate the payroll tax and increase a consumption tax
above baseline. This leads to welfare gains across the economy. They then investigate the
welfare dynamics during the transitional period, where they nd that the newly retired
and nearly retired face the largest welfare cost of this restructuring. They advocate for an
additional transfer payment to be made during the transition to maintain utility levels for
these individuals.
Findley and Caliendo (2009) study the short-term planning model of Caliendo and
Aaland (2007), supplemented with an unfunded social security program that is nanced
with payroll taxation. They demonstrate that the program can be welfare improving for
some planning horizons in general equilibrium. An open question remains as to whether or
not a payroll tax is the best instrument to nance an unfunded program.
Indeed, I revisit the ability for social security to provide adequate retirement resources
in the short-horizon framework used by Findley and Caliendo (2009). My contribution is
the addition of an unfunded social security program nanced with taxation on consumption.
I nd that a payroll-tax nanced program can be replaced with a consumption-tax nanced
program. Such a move generates welfare gains in partial equilibrium, although the welfare
gains are small.
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2 Model
I model a representative individual who optimizes consumption and saving behavior over
a short planning horizon. Time is continuous and indexed by t. The individual enters the
workforce at t = 0. The individual retires at t = T , and dies at age t = T . During the
working period t 2 [0; T ] the individual receives wages at rate w, and during the retirement
period t 2 T; T  the individual receives social security benets b = Rww +Cc=   T   T .
The individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically while working. R =
T
T   T is the
worker to retiree ratio. w is the payroll tax rate. c is the consumption tax rate. C is
aggregate consumption in the economy. Consumption at each instant is c(t) and is the
control variable. Any income not consumed at each instant is placed in the individuals
asset account, k(t), which grows at rate r. There are no borrowing constraints placed on
the individual, and k(0) = k( T ) = 0 is assumed. The planning horizon length x is the
amount of time over which an individual optimizes. I impose the restriction x  T   T for
ease of modeling, as is customary in this model. It allows for a simple compartmentalization
of the life cycle:
 Phase 1 [0; T   x]
 Phase 2 [T   x; T ]
 Phase 3 T; T   x
 Phase 4  T   x; T 
Phase 1 is the period of the life cycle during which the individual is in the workforce
and does not foresee retirement. Phase 2 is that period of the life cycle when the individual
is still in the workforce, but can see the future date of retirement. Phase 3 is after the
individual is retired from the workforce, but does not foresee the date of death. Phase 4 is
that part of retirement when the individual can see the date of death.
Inside the short planning horizon model, the individuals behavior is time-inconsistent
in Phases 1-3. This is due to the sliding planning window which moves through time with
the individual. I model a naive individual, meaning that the individual does not anticipate
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his time-inconsistant behavior. Therefore, the individuals actual behavior is the envelope
of the initial moments solved for during the optimization. The derivations of the following
solutions can be found in Appendix A.
2.1 Phase 1
At any t0 2 [0; T   x] the individual solves
max
c(t)
:
Z t0+x
t0
e (t t0)
c(t)1 
1   dt (1)
subject to
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t) (2)
k (t0) given (3)
k (t0 + x) = 0, (4)
where  is the personal discount rate and  is the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution (IEIS). The solution to (1)-(4) is the optimal planned path from the perspective of
t0 2 [0; T   x],
c^(t) = egt
"
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R t0+x
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
e(g r)jdj
#
, (5)
for t 2 [t0; t0 + x] where g = r   

.
Following Caliendo and Aaland (2007), the actual consumption prole can be derived
by replacing t0 with t
c(t) = egt
2664k (t) e rt +
w (1  w)
r
 
e rt   e rte rx
1 + c
g   r
 
e(g r)(t+x)   e(g r)t
3775 , (6)
for t 2 [0; T   x]. This can be more simply expressed as
c(t) = k(t)z1 + wz2, (7)
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where
z1  (g   r)
(1 + c)
 
e(g r)x   1 (8)
z2  (1  w) (g   r) (1  e
 rx)
(1 + c)
 
e(g r)x   1 , (9)
and the asset account follows the path
k(t) =
 
e
t   1 w [(1  w)  (1 + c) z2]


, (10)
where 
 = [r   (1 + c) z1].
2.2 Phase 2
At any t0 2 [T   x; T ] the individual solves
max
c(t)
:
Z t0+x
t0
e (t t0)
c(t)1 
1   dt (11)
subject to
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t) (12)
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t) (13)
k (t0) given (14)
k (t0 + x) = 0. (15)
The planned consumption path is the solution to equations (11)-(15),
c^ (t) =
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R T
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj +
R t0+x
T be
 rjdj
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
egte rjdj
egt, (16)
for t 2 [t0; t0 + x]. The actual path is
c (t) =
k (t) e rt +
R T
t w (1  w) e rjdj +
R t+x
T be
 rjdj
(1 + c)
R t+x
t e
(g r)jdj
egt (17)
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for t 2 [T   x; T ]. Using z1 from above, it can be rewritten as
c (t) = k(t)z1 +
w (1  w)
r
z1e
rt
 
e rt   e rT + b
r
z1e
rt

e rT   e r(t+x)

(18)
where
k (t) = e
t

e 
(T x)k (T   x) + w (1  w)



e 
(T x)   e 
t

+
w (1  w) (1 + c) z1
r

e rT
r   


e(r 
)t   e(r 
)(T x)   1


h
e 
(T x)   e 
t
i
+
b (1 + c) z1
r

e rT
r   


e(r 
)(T x)   e(r 
)t

+
e rx



e 
(T x)   e 
t

.(19)
2.3 Phase 3
At any t0 2

T; T   x the individual solves
max
c(t)
:
Z t0+x
t0
e (t t0)
c(t)1 
1   dt (20)
subject to
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t) (21)
k (t0) given (22)
k (t0 + x) = 0. (23)
The solution is the planned consumption path for t 2 [t0; t0 + x],
c^(t) = egt
"
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R t0+x
t0
be rjdj
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
e(g r)jdj
#
. (24)
The actual path for t 2 T; T   x is
c(t) = egt
2664k (t) e rt +
b
r
 
e rt   e r(t+x)
1 + c
g   r
 
e(g r)t   e(g r)(t+x)
3775 , (25)
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which is the envelope of initial planned consumption allocations given
k(t) = k(T )e 
(T t) +
bcz3



1  e 
(T t)

. (26)
2.4 Phase 4
Since the individual can see the date of death in this phase, behavior is time-consistent. The
planned consumption path from the perspective of t0 = T x will be the actual consumption
path,
c(t) = egtz4, (27)
where
z4 =
g   r
1 + c
264k
 
T   x erx   b (1  erx)
r
egT
 
1  e x(g r)
375 . (28)
This characterizes the asset path during Phase 4 with
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t) (29)
and k
 
T   x known.
2.5 Social security in the model
I will examine two options for social security nancing in this model. A tax on consumption,
c, will be levied against all consumption in the model. I will also examine a payroll tax,
w, as done in Findley and Caliendo (2009). I will compare the two alternate tax regimes.
The unfunded program has a balanced budget and the individual does not take into account
the e¤ects that his consumption level has on the level of benets, such that
b =
c
hR T x
0 c(t)dt+
R T
T x c(t)dt+
R T x
T c(t)dt+
R T
T x c(t)dt
i
T   T +Rww (30)
for t 2 [T; T ].
The use of a consumption tax to nance benets creates an implicit function, since c(t)
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is a function of b while b is a function of c(t). Yet, it is possible to numerically approximate
the level of benets. Due to the inelasticity of labor supply in this model the payroll-tax
portion of benets is easily demonstrated analytically.
3 Simulation and numerical exercises
3.1 Baseline model parameters
The baseline parameters are summarized in Table(1). I set T = 40 and T = 55 which
represents an individual who enters the work force at age 25, retires at age 65, and dies at
age 80. I set the real rate of return, r, to 0.035. The worker to retiree ratio is approximately
2.667. I set r =  following convention. I set  = 1, making utility logarithmic.
3.2 Optimal tax rates
I will allow the model to determine the optimal payroll tax rate, w, and the optimal
consumption tax rate, c , for each planning horizon length, x. The optimal rate for both
programs is the rate that paternalistically maximizes lifetime utility for the individual,
c  arg max
c2[0;1];w=0
R T x
0 e
 t c(t)
1 
1   dt+
R T
T x e
 t c(t)
1 
1   dt
+
R T x
T e
 t c(t)
1 
1   dt+
R T
T x e
 t c(t)
1 
1   dt
 (31)
w  arg max
w2[0;1];c=0
R T x
0 e
 t c(t)
1 
1   dt+
R T
T x e
 t c(t)
1 
1   dt
+
R T x
T e
 t c(t)
1 
1   dt+
R T
T x e
 t c(t)
1 
1   dt

,
(32)
where  is the social discount rate.
3.3 Individual life-cycle consumption proles
Simulated consumption proles using the baseline parameters in Table(1) can be seen in
Figure(1) for the case of no transfer program c = 0 and for the case of a program with c =
0:10 . The individual consumes less during Phase 1 and part of Phase 2, but has increased
consumption during part of Phase 2 and all of Phases 3 and 4. The consumption tax does
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not distort the asset account during Phase 1 as seen in Figure(2). The tax proportionally
decreases consumption during Phase 1. This non-distortion of the asset account holds for
a wide array of parameters as shown in Figures(2,4,6). During Phase 2-4 the tax rate does
change saving rates and consumption levels. It is important to note that the asset account
with a program in place is always less than or equal to the asset account when a program
is not present. This is similar to the result for the LCPI consumer in which the presence of
an unfunded program causes the individual to save less for retirement.
3.4 Welfare analysis: social security vs. no program
Here, I study an unfunded program nanced by a consumption tax compared to the coun-
terfactual of no program at all. In doing this, I dene a compensating variation (CV ) as the
percentage increase in period consumption that is needed to equalize lifetime utility without
a program to the lifetime utility with an optimally parameterized social security program.
In Table (2) I display the compensating variation. For all planning horizons which have a
non-zero optimal tax, an unfunded program raises well-being. I also report in Table (3) that
an optimally parametrized payroll-tax nanced program is welfare improving, compared to
no program at all.
3.5 Welfare analysis: consumption-tax nancing vs. payroll-tax nancing
The welfare metric that I use is that of a paternalistic social planner, where the social
discount rate of  evaluates utils over the entire life span, even though the individual is
optimizing over a short-horizon. This is consistent with the majority of the behavioral
economics literature.
I now dene a uniquely di¤erent compensating variation, , to measure the percentage
increase in c(t) under a particular tax regime in order to approximate the value of par-
ticipating in an optimally parameterized social security program. With  = 1 the utility
11
function becomes logarithmic, and  solves the following equation,
nR T x
0 e
 t ln [(1 + ) cw(t)] dt+
R T
T x e
 t ln [(1 + ) cw(t)] dt
+
R T x
T e
 t ln [(1 + ) cw(t)] dt+
R T
T x e
 t ln [(1 + ) cw(t)] dt
o
=
nR T x
0 e
 t ln [cc(t)] dt+
R T
T x e
 t ln [cc(t)] dt
+
R T x
T e
 t ln [cc(t)] dt+
R T
T x e
 t ln [cc(t)] dt
o
.
(33)
Solving for  gives
 = exp
"
Uc   UwR T
0 e
 tdt
#
  1 (34)
where
Uw =
Z T x
0
e t ln [cw(t)] dt+
Z T
T x
e t ln [cw(t)] dt
+
Z T x
T
e t ln [cw(t)] dt+
Z T
T x
e t ln [cw(t)] dt
)
(35)
Uc =
Z T x
0
e t ln [cc(t)] dt+
Z T
T x
e t ln [cc(t)] dt
+
Z T x
T
e t ln [cc(t)] dt+
Z T
T x
e t ln [cc(t)] dt
)
. (36)
The optimal tax rates are reported in Tables(4-9) for a range of parameter values.
I compare the utility of two identical individuals under the di¤erent tax regimes using the
 metric. As reported in Tables(4-9), I nd that the consumption-tax nanced program has
a higher total welfare, but only marginally. When using the Ramsey criteria for measuring
welfare (such that the social planner does not discount utility,  = 0), I nd that there
are large gains in well-being from a consumption-tax nanced program compared to a
payroll-tax nanced program. In this partial-equilibrium model the di¤erences between the
consumption and saving proles are relatively small, with the paths almost laying on top of
each other. But the cumulative utility gains from the consumption-tax nanced program
are sizable.
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3.6 Robustness check of computational code
To check for potential computational errors in the simulation environment, I calculate the
present value of taxes collected over a given planning horizon. If the present value of taxes
is equal across tax regimes, then the behavior should be the same regardless of which tax
regime is in place. I analytically solve for when each of the two regimes have the same
present value of tax revenues for a given planning horizon.
The present value of taxes in a payroll-tax nanced regime is
Iw =
Z t0+x
t0
e rtwwdt, (37)
and the present value of taxes in a consumption-tax nanced program is
Ic =
Z t0+x
t0
e rtcc^(t)dt, (38)
where c^(t) is the planned consumption path from the perspective of the planning instant
t0. Setting (37) equal to (38) yields
w =
c
1 + c
(39)
where the derivation is found in Appendix B. I use this equation to estimate the di¤erence
in the present values of the tax regimes within the simulations environment. I found the
two calculations to be almost identical.
4 Summary and possible extensions for future work
The presence of an unfunded security program can improve well-being. A consumption-tax
nanced program leads to slightly higher levels of well-being as compared to a program
using payroll taxation. Due to the smoothing of consumption over the life-cycle, there is
an increase in lifetime utility. There is an opportunity to extend this research by allowing
factor prices to adjust given behavior in the model. A general-equilibrium setting would
likely lean to di¤erent quantitative results. This merits further investigation. Another in-
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teresting extension could be heterogeneity in the length of planning horizons across di¤erent
individuals in the model population.
Appendix A: derivations of consumption and savings proles
Phase 1 [0; T   x]
The individual solves
max
c(t)
:
Z t0+x
t0
e (t t0)
c(t)1 
1   dt (40)
subject to
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t) (41)
k (t0) given (42)
k (t0 + x) = 0. (43)
Using the Maximum Principle for a one-stage problem results in the following Hamiltonian
equation and optimality conditions,
H = e (t t0)
c(t)1 
1   +  (t) (rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t)) (44)
@H
@c
= e (t t0)c(t)     (t) (1 + c) = 0 (45)
@H
@k
= r (t) =  d
dt
(46)
@H
@
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t) = dk (t)
dt
. (47)
Solving the maximum condition for c(t)
c(t) =

e (t t0)
1
 (t) (1 + c)
 1

. (48)
Solving the costate equation
d
dt
=  r (t)!  (t) = ae rt. (49)
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The constant of integration can be denitized such that
 (t0) = ae
 rt0 (50)
a =  (t0) e
rt0 (51)
 (t) =  (t0) e
r(t0 t). (52)
Substituting equation (52) into (48) gives
c(t) =

e (t t0)
1
 (t0) er(t0 t) (1 + c)
 1

(53)
= egt

1
 (t0) (1 + c)
e(r )t0
 1

(54)
where g =
r   

. This can be simplied as
c(t) = egtA (55)
where A =

1
 (t0) (1 + c)
e(r )t0
 1

is a transformation of the unknown constant. Solving
the state equation yields
k (t) = ert

q +
Z t
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

. (56)
Using the boundary condition, k (t0) given, pins down the constant of integration
k (t0) = e
rt0

q +
Z t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

(57)
k (t0) e
 rt0 = q +
Z t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj (58)
q = k (t0) e
 rt0  
Z t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj. (59)
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The particular solution is
k (t) = ert

k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t
t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

. (60)
Using the other boundary condition, k (t0 + x) = 0,
ert0+x

k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

= 0 (61)
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj = 0 (62)
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj =
Z t0+x
t0
(1 + c) c (j) e
 rjdj. (63)
Substituting equation (55) into (63) gives
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj =
Z t0+x
t0
(1 + c) e
gjAe rjdj (64)
(1 + c)A
Z t0+x
t0
e(g r)jdj = k (t0) e rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj, (65)
which allows us to solve for the transformation of the unknown constant
A =
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R t0+x
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
e(g r)jdj
. (66)
Therefore, planned consumption is
c^(t) = egt
"
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R t0+x
t0
w (j) (1  w) e rjdj
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
e(g r)jdj
#
(67)
in closed-form. Since actual behavior will be decided from reoptimization at every instant,
the actual paths can be mapped by replacing t0 with t in (67). This gives the actual
consumption path
c(t) = egt
"
k (t) e rt +
R t+x
t w (1  w) e rjdj
(1 + c)
R t+x
t e
(g r)jdj
#
(68)
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= egt
2664k (t) e rt +
w (1  w)
r
 
e rt   e rte rx
(1 + c)
(g   r)
 
e(g r)te(g r)x   e(g r)t
3775 (69)
= k(t)z1 + wz2 (70)
with algebraic simplication, where
z1 =
(g   r)
(1 + c)
 
e(g r)x   1 (71)
z2 =
(1  w) (g   r) (1  e rx)
(1 + c)
 
e(g r)x   1 . (72)
Substituting equation (70) into the law of motion that governs the actual evolution of the
asset account,
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) (k(t)z1 + wz2) (73)
= k (t) (r   z1 (1 + c)) + w (1  w)  (1 + c)wz2. (74)
Solving this di¤erential equation gives
k(t) = e(r z1(1+c))t

q +
Z t
(w (1  w)  (1 + c)wz2) e (r z1(1+c))jdj

. (75)
With the initial condition, k(0) = 0, and with 
 = r   (1 + c) z1, the constant can be
identied
0 = e
0

q +
Z 0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c)wz2) e 
jdj

(76)
q =  
Z 0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c)wz2) e 
jdj (77)
which provides a closed-form solution for the asset path during Phase 1
k(t) = e
t
Z t
0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c)wz2) e 
jdj (78)
=
 
e
t   1 w ((1  w)  (1 + c) z2)


. (79)
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Phase 2 [T   x; T ]
The individual can see both work income and the social security benets ow, but he is still
working. The individual solves
max
c(t)
:
Z t0+x
t0
e (t t0)
c(t)1 
1   dt (80)
subject to
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t) (81)
for t = [t0; T ] and
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t) (82)
for t = [T; t0 + x], where
k (t0 + x) = 0 (83)
k (t0) given. (84)
Using the Maximum Principle for two-stage problems results in the following Hamiltonians
and optimality conditions,
H1 = e
 (t t0) c(t)
1 
1   + 1 (t) (rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t)) (85)
H2 = e
 (t t0) c(t)
1 
1   + 2 (t) (rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t)) (86)
@H1
@c
= e (t t0)c(t)    1 (t) (1 + c) = 0 (87)
@H1
@k
= r1 (t) =  d1
dt
(88)
@H1
@1
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t) = dk (t)
dt
(89)
@H2
@c
= e (t t0)c(t)    2 (t) (1 + c) = 0 (90)
@H2
@k
= r2 (t) =  d2
dt
(91)
18
@H2
@2
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t) = dk (t)
dt
. (92)
The two multipliers are dened as 1 for t = [t0; T ] and 2 for t = [T; t0 + x] and obey the
costate equations, (88) and (91), rewritten as
d1
dt
=  r1 (t) (93)
for t = [t0; T ]
d2
dt
=  r2 (t) (94)
for t = [T; t0 + x]. Two-stage problems require a condition,
1 (T ) = 2 (T ) , (95)
which links the multipliers at the switch point. Solving equations (93) and (94) while
denitizing the constants of integration yields
1 (t) = a1e
 rt ! a1 = 1 (T ) erT (96)
2 (t) = a2e
 rt ! a2 = 2 (T ) erT (97)
Invoking the matching condition gives 1 (T ) = 2 (T ) ! a2 = a1, such that continuity
exists across the switchpoint such that subscripts can be dropped.
 (t0) = ae
 rt0 (98)
a =  (t0) e
rt0 (99)
 (t) =  (t0) e
r(t0 t) (100)
Solving the rst maximum condition for c(t) gives
c(t) =

e (t t0)
1
 (t) (1 + c)
 1

. (101)
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Substituting in equation (100) gives
c(t) =

e (t t0)
1
 (t0) er(t0 t) (1 + c)
 1

(102)
= egt

1
 (t0) (1 + c)
e(r )t0
 1

(103)
where g =
r   

. This can be condensed
c(t) = egtA (104)
where A =

1
 (t0) (1 + c)
e(r )t0
 1

is a transformation of the unknown constant. Solving
the second maximum condition for c(t) yields
c(t) =

e (t t0)
1
 (t) (1 + c)
 1

(105)
and substituting equation (100) into (105) yields
c(t) =

e (t t0)
1
 (t0) er(t0 t) (1 + c)
 1

(106)
= egt

1
 (t0) (1 + c)
e(r )t0
 1

(107)
where g =
r   

. This can also be simplied
c(t) = egtA (108)
where A =

1
 (t0) (1 + c)
e(r )t0
 1

is also a transformation of the unknown constant.
Note that (108) and (104) are identical, therefore no distinction will be made after this.
Solving the rst state equation gives
k (t) = ert

q +
Z t
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

(109)
20
for t 2 [t0; T ]. Using the initial condition k (t0) given denitizes the unknown constant,
k (t0) = e
rt0

q +
Z t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

(110)
k (t0) e
 rt0 = q +
Z t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj (111)
q = k (t0) e
 rt0  
Z t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj. (112)
This gives the intended asset path for t 2 [t0; T ],
k (t) = ert

k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t
t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

(113)
Evaluate (113) at t = T
k (T ) = erT

k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z T
t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

. (114)
Solving the second state equation gives
k (t) = ert

q +
Z t
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

(115)
for t 2 [T; t0 + x]. Using k (t0 + x) = 0 identies the unknown constant,
k (t0 + x) = e
rt0+x

q +
Z t0+x
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

= 0 (116)
q =  
Z t0+x
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj. (117)
Therefore, the particular solution is
k (t) = ert
Z t
t0+x
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

, (118)
which can be evaluated at t = T ,
k (T ) = erT
Z T
t0+x
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

. (119)
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Set (114) equal to (119)
erT
Z T
t0+x
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

= erT

k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z T
t0
(w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

. (120)
This can be rearranged
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z T
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj  
Z T
t0+x
be rjdj
=
Z T
t0
(1 + c) c (j) e
 rjdj  
Z T
t0+x
(1 + c) c (j) e
 rjdj (121)
and further simplied
(1 + c)
Z t0+x
t0
c (j) e rjdj
= k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z T
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj +
Z t0+x
T
be rjdj. (122)
Substituting in for c (t),
(1 + c)A
Z t0+x
t0
egje rjdj
= k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z T
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj +
Z t0+x
T
be rjdj (123)
the transformation of the unknown constant is identied,
A =
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R T
t0
w (1  w) e rjdj +
R t0+x
T be
 rjdj
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
egje rjdj
. (124)
Inserting (124) into (108) yields planned consumption in closed-form,
c^ (t) =
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R T
t0
w (z) (1  w) e rzdz +
R t0+x
T b (t) e
 rzdz
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
egte rzdz
egt. (125)
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Replacing t0 with t gives the actual consumption path
c (t) =
k (t) e rt +
R T
t w (1  w) e rjdj +
R t+x
T be
 rjdj
(1 + c)
R t+x
t e
(g r)jdj
egt (126)
=
k (t) e rt +
w (1  w)
r
 
e rt   e rT + b
r
 
e rT   e r(t+x)
(1 + c)
(g   r)
 
e(t+x)(g r)   e(g r)t . (127)
Using z1 from above, this can be simplied
c (t) = k(t)z1 +
w (1  w)
r
z1e
rt
 
e rt   e rT + b
r
z1e
rt

e rT   e r(t+x)

. (128)
Inserting (128) into
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) c (t) gives
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + w (1  w)  (1 + c) k(t)z1 + (1 + c)w (1  w)
r
z1e
rt
 
e rT   e rt
+ (1 + c)
b
r
z1e
rt

e r(t+x)   e rT

(129)
= k (t) 
 + w (1  w) + (1 + c)w (1  w)
r
z1e
rt
 
e rT   e rt
+ (1 + c)
b
r
z1e
rt

e r(t+x)   e rT

(130)
rewritten with 
 = (r   (1 + c) z1). Solving this di¤erential equation yields a general
solution,
k (t) = e
t

q +
Z t 
w (1  w)  (1 + c)

w (1  w)
r
z1e
rj
 
e rj   e rT 
+
b
r
z1e
rj
h
e rT   e r(j+x)
i
e 
jdj

. (131)
Using the initial condition for Phase 2 denitizes the unknown constant, q, such that
k (T   x) = e
(T x)

q +
Z T x 
w (1  w)  (1 + c)

w (1  w)
r
z1e
rj
 
e rj   e rT 
+
b
r
z1e
rj
h
e rT   e r(j+x)
i
e 
jdj

(132)
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q = k (T   x) e 
(T x)  
Z T x 
w (1  w)  (1 + c)

w (1  w)
r
z1e
rj

e rf   e rT

+
b
r
z1e
rj
h
e rT   e r(j+x)
i
e 
jdj. (133)
This yields the actual solution for the asset path
k (t) = k (T   x) e 
(T x t) + e
t
Z t
T x

(1  w)w   (1 + c)

w (1  w)
r
z1e
rj
 
e rj   e rT 
+
b
r
z1e
rj
h
e rT   e r(j+x)
i
e 
jdj (134)
= e
tk (T   x) e 
(T x) + e
t
Z t
T x
w (1  w) e 
jdj
 e
t
Z t
T x
(1 + c)
w (1  w)
r
z1e
rj
 
e rj   e rT  e 
jdj
 e
t
Z t
T x
(1 + c)
b
r
z1e
rj

e rT   e r(j+x)

e 
jdj (135)
= e
t

e 
(T x)k (T   x) + w (1  w)



e 
(T x)   e 
t

  w (1  w) (1 + c) z1
r
Z t
T x
h
1  e r(T j)
i
e 
jdj
  b (1 + c) z1
r
Z t
T x
erj

e rT   e r(j+x)

e 
jdj

(136)
= e
t

e 
(T x)k (T   x) + w (1  w)



e 
(T x)   e 
t

 w (1  w) (1 + c) z1
r
Z t
T x
e 
jdj  
Z t
T x
e r(T j)e 
jdj

  b (1 + c) z1
r
Z t
T x
e rT e(r 
)jdj  
Z t
T x
e rxe 
jdj

(137)
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= e
t

e 
(T x)k (T   x) + w (1  w)



e 
(T x)   e 
t

+
w (1  w) (1 + c) z1
r

e rT
r   


e(r 
)t   e(r 
)(T x)   1


h
e 
(T x)   e 
t
i
+
b (1 + c) z1
r

e rT
r   


e(r 
)(T x)   e(r 
)t

+
e rx



e 
(T x)   e 
t

. (138)
Phase 3

T; T   x
The individual solves
max
c(t)
:
Z t0+x
t0
e (t t0)
c(t)1 
1   dt (139)
subject to
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t) (140)
k (t0) given (141)
k (t0 + x) = 0. (142)
Using the Maximum Principle, the Hamiltonian and optimality conditions are
H = e (t t0)
c(t)1 
1   +  (t) (rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t)) (143)
@H
@c
= e (t t0)c(t)     (t) (1 + c) = 0 (144)
@H
@k
= r (t) =  d
dt
(145)
@H
@
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t) = dk (t)
dt
. (146)
Solving the maximum condition gives
c(t) =

e (t t0)
1
 (t) (1 + c)
 1

, (147)
and solving the costate equation yields
d
dt
=  r (t)!  (t) = ae rt, (148)
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where the unknown constant can be rewritten
 (t0) = ae
 rt0 (149)
a =  (t0) e
rt0 (150)
such that
 (t) =  (t0) e
r(t0 t). (151)
Substituting (151) into (147),
c(t) =

e (t t0)
1
 (t0) er(t0 t) (1 + c)
 1

(152)
= egt

1
 (t0) (1 + c)
e(r )t0
 1

, (153)
where g =
r   

. The notation can be compressed for simplicity, such that
c(t) = egtA (154)
where A =

1
 (t0) (1 + c)
e(r )t0
 1

is again a tranformation of the unknown constant of
integration. Solving the state equation yields
k (t) = ert

q +
Z t
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

(155)
for t 2 [t0; t0 + x]. Using the initial condition, k (t0) given, identies q
k (t0) = e
rt0

q +
Z t0
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

(156)
q = k (t0) e
 rt0  
Z t0
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj. (157)
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The intended asset path is therefore
k (t) = ert

k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t
t0
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

. (158)
Using the boundary condition, k (t0 + x) = 0,
er(t0+x)

k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
(b  (1 + c) c (j)) e rjdj

= 0, (159)
which is simplied as
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
be rjdj =
Z t0+x
t0
(1 + c) c (j) e
 rjdj. (160)
Substituting (154) in for c (t) gives
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
be rjdj =
Z t0+x
t0
(1 + c) e
gjAe rjdj (161)
(1 + c)A
Z t0+x
t0
e(g r)jdj = k (t0) e rt0 +
Z t0+x
t0
be rjdj, (162)
where the tranformation of the unknown constant is identied
A =
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R t0+x
t0
be rjdj
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
e(g r)jdj
. (163)
Therefore, the planned consumption path is
c^(t) = egt
"
k (t0) e
 rt0 +
R t0+x
t0
be rjdj
(1 + c)
R t0+x
t0
e(g r)jdj
#
. (164)
Replacing t0 with t yields the actual consumption path,
c(t) = egt
"
k (t) e rt +
R t+x
t be
 rjdj
(1 + c)
R t+x
t e
(g r)jdj
#
(165)
= egt
2664k (t) e rt +
b
r
 
e rt   e r(t+x)
(1 + c)
(g   r)
 
e(g r)t   e(g r)(t+x)
3775 . (166)
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Using z1 from above and reducing the fraction,
c(t) = k(t)z1 +
b
r
(g   r) (1  e rx)
(1 + c)
 
e(g r)x   1 (167)
= k(t)z1 + bz3
where
z3 =
(g   r) (1  e rx)
r (1 + c)
 
e(g r)x   1 . (168)
The actual law of motion for Phase 3 is
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) c (t) (169)
= rk (t) + b  (1 + c) [k(t)z1 + bz3] (170)
= k (t) (r   (1 + c) z1) + b (1  (1 + cz3)) . (171)
Rewriting this with 
 = r   (1 + c) z1 and then solving gives a general solution
k(t) = e
t

q +
Z t
b (1  (1 + cz3)) e 
jdj

. (172)
Using the actual initial condition for Phase 3 identies the unknown constant
k(T ) = e
T

q +
Z T
b (1  (1 + cz3)) e 
jdj

(173)
q = k(T )e 
T  
Z T
b (1  (1 + cz3)) e 
jdj. (174)
The actual asset path is therefore
k(t) = e
t

k(T )e 
T +
Z t
T
b (1  (1 + cz3)) e 
jdj

(175)
= e
t

k(T )e 
T +
b (1  (1 + cz3))


 
e 
T   e 
t (176)
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= k(T )e 
(T t) +
b (1  (1 + cz3))



e 
(T t)   1

. (177)
Phase 4

T   x; T 
There is no time inconsistency in this phase. The path can be easily acquired by evaluating
(164) at t0 = T   x,
c(t) = egt
24k  T   x e r(T x) + R TT x be rjdj
(1 + c)
R T
T x e
(g r)jdj
35 (178)
= egt
266664
k
 
T   x e r(T x)   b

e rT   e r(T x)

r
(1 + c)

e(g r)T   e(g r)(T x)

377775 (g   r) (179)
= egt (g   r)
2664k
 
T   x e r(T x)   be rT (1  erx)
r
(1 + c) e(g r)T
 
1  e x(g r)
3775 (180)
= egt
(g   r)
(1 + c)
264k
 
T   x erx   b (1  erx)
r
egT
 
1  e x(g r)
375 . (181)
Dening
z4 =
(g   r)
(1 + c)
264k
 
T   x erx   b (1  erx)
r
egT
 
1  e x(g r)
375 , (182)
actual consumption can be rewritten
c(t) = egtz4. (183)
Coupled with
dk (t)
dt
= rk (t) + b   (1 + c) c (t) and k
 
T   x given, (183) characterizes
the asset path during Phase 4.
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Appendix B: derivation of the present value of taxes
Assuming t0 = 0 for simplicity of demonstration, which corresponds to Phase 1, the present
value of taxes paid over a short horizon in the payroll-tax nanced regime is
Iw 
Z x
0
e rtwwdt (184)
=
ww
r
 
1  e rx . (185)
The present value of taxes paid in the consumption-tax nanced regime is
Ic 
Z x
0
e rtcc^(t)dt (186)
=
cc^(0)
g   r

e(g r)x   1

(187)
where
c^(t) = c^(0)egt, (188)
and where
c^(0) =
w(1  w)
R x
0 e
 rtdt
(1 + c)
R x
0 e
(g r)tdt
(189)
=
w(1  w)
r
(1  e rx)
(1 + c)
(g   r)
 
e(g r)x   1 . (190)
This can be rewritten
Ic =
c
g   r

e(g r)x   1
 w(1  w)
r
(1  e rx)
(1 + c)
(g   r)
 
e(g r)x   1 (191)
=
cw(1  w)
(1 + c)r
 
1  e rx . (192)
Comparing only one tax regime at a time, w = 0 such that
Ic =
cw
(1 + c)r
 
1  e rx (193)
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Setting Ic equal to Iw with a scaler inserted suggests
Iw  = Ic, (194)
or rewritten with substitution
ww
r
 
1  e rx  = cw
(1 + c)r
 
1  e rx . (195)
This can also be written as
  =
c
(1 + c)w
, (196)
or as
w =
c
(1 + c)
(197)
with   = 1.
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Table 1
Baseline parameters
Retirement date T 40
Date of death T 55
planning horizon x 10
IEIS  1
Personal discount rate  0:035
retiree to worker ratio R 2:667
wage w 40000
real rate or return r 0:035
Table 2
No program vs. consumption-tax nanced program
W0 Ww CV
1 236.3025252 252.6870847 34.70285%
2 246.2265692 252.7763546 12.64679%
3 249.5221449 252.8793832 6.29422%
4 251.1668483 252.9992367 3.38774%
5 252.152197 253.1384632 1.80939%
6 252.8081444 253.2981998 0.89499%
7 253.2759645 253.4785241 0.36897%
8 253.6262497 253.6790217 0.09600%
9 253.898201 253.899142 0.00171%
10 254.1153312 254.1153312 0
11 254.292599 254.292599 0
12 254.4399751 254.4399751 0
13 254.564361 254.564361 0
14 254.6706858 254.6706858 0
15 254.7625637 254.7625637 0
 = 0:035,  = :035, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40
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Table 3
No program vs. payroll-tax nanced program
W0 Wc CV
1 236.3025252 252.6862788 34.70088%
2 246.2265692 252.7732336 12.64040%
3 249.5221449 252.8726371 6.28118%
4 251.1668483 252.9881505 3.36690%
5 252.152197 253.123226 1.78118%
6 252.8081444 253.2802075 0.86199%
7 253.2759645 253.4606859 0.33642%
8 253.6262497 253.6661419 0.07256%
9 253.898201 253.898201 0
10 254.1153312 254.1153312 0
11 254.292599 254.292599 0
12 254.4399751 254.4399751 0
13 254.564361 254.564361 0
14 254.6706858 254.6706858 0
15 254.7625637 254.7625637 0
 = 0:035,  = :035, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40
Table 4
x c Uc w Uw 
1 :125 252:6871 :112 252:6863 0:00330%
2 :116 252:7764 :104 252:7732 0:01279%
3 :106 252:8794 :096 252:8726 0:02765%
4 :094 252:9992 :086 252:9882 0:04544%
5 :079 253:1385 :073 253:1232 0:06246%
6 :063 253:2982 :059 253:2802 0:07376%
7 :045 253:4785 :042 253:4607 0:07312%
8 :025 235:6790 :022 253:6661 0:05279%
9 :004 254:8991 0 253:8982 0:00386%
10 0 254:1153 0 254:1153 0
11 0 254:2926 0 254:2926 0
12 0 254:4400 0 254:4400 0
13 0 254:5644 0 254:5644 0
14 0 254:6707 0 254:6707 0
15 0 254:7626 0 254:7626 0
Note.  = 0:035,  = :035, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40
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Table 5
x c Uc w Uw 
1 :174 308:4714 :149 308:4695 :00657%
2 :165 308:5540 :142 308:5463 :02570%
3 :155 308:6604 :134 308:6437 :05608%
4 :142 308:7936 :124 308:7654 :09448%
5 :126 308:9556 :112 308:9151 :13564%
6 :109 309:1477 :097 309:0962 :17233%
7 :089 309:3703 :079 309:3119 :19544%
8 :066 309:6234 :058 309:8617 :19325%
9 :042 309:9069 :033 309:8617 :15141%
10 :016 310:2202 :004 310:2047 :05193%
11 0 310:5562 0 310:5562 0
12 0 310:8565 0 310:8565 0
13 0 311:1156 0 311:1156 0
14 0 311:3416 0 311:3416 0
15 0 311:5403 0 311:5403 0
Note.  = 0:025,  = 0:025, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40
Table 6
x c Uc w Uw 
1 :089 211:4763 :082 211:4761 :00123%
2 :080 211:5726 :074 211:5716 :00477%
3 :070 211:6777 :066 211:6756 :01039%
4 :059 211:7964 :056 211:7913 :01668%
5 :046 211:9263 :044 211:9219 :02148%
6 :031 212:0735 :030 212:0691 :02193%
7 :015 212:2356 :013 212:2327 :01427%
8 0 212:4104 0 212:4104 0
9 0 212:5603 0 212:5603 0
10 0 212:6770 0 212:6770 0
11 0 212:7700 0 212:7700 0
12 0 212:8452 0 212:8452 0
13 0 212:9070 0 212:9070 0
14 0 212:9585 0 212:9585 0
15 0 213:0018 0 213:0018 0
Note.  = 0:045,  = 0:045, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40
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Table 7
x c Uc w Uw 
1 :374 565:3000 :272 562:7388 4:76679%
2 :371 565:3004 :271 562:9414 4:38237%
3 :366 565:3026 :269 563:1766 3:94103%
4 :359 565:3085 :266 563:4393 3:45695%
5 :349 565:3209 :262 563:7199 2:95371%
6 :337 565:3431 :257 564:0081 2:45685%
7 :323 565:3782 :250 564:2955 1:98807%
8 :306 565:4298 :242 564:5765 1:56368%
9 :288 565:5014 :232 564:8478 1:19540%
10 :267 565:5965 :221 565:1082 0:89184%
11 :245 565:7188 :207 565:3572 0:65964%
12 :220 565:8716 :190 565:5949 0:50444%
13 :194 566:0587 :170 565:8220 0:43127%
14 :166 566:2832 :146 566:0400 0:44327%
15 :137 566:5486 :116 566:2936 0:46484%
Note.  = 0:035,  = 0, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40
Table 8
x c Uc w Uw 
1 :374 565:2580 :272 562:7530 4:65972%
2 :371 565:2970 :271 562:9989 4:26686%
3 :365 565:3624 :268 563:3064 3:80884%
4 :356 565:4555 :264 563:6687 3:30197%
5 :344 565:5783 :258 564:0726 2:77548%
6 :329 565:7334 :251 564:5032 2:26184%
7 :311 565:9231 :242 564:9476 1:78939%
8 :291 566:1499 :230 565:3959 1:38025%
9 :268 566:4161 :216 565:8412 1:0579%
10 :243 566:7788 :198 566:2785 0:91387%
11 :215 567:1300 :177 566:7046 0:77635%
12 :186 567:5262 :152 567:1175 0:74581%
13 :154 567:9690 :121 567:5568 0:75219%
14 :121 568:4595 :083 568:0839 0:68528%
15 :087 568:9987 :037 568:7190 0:5984%
Note.  = 0:025,  = 0, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40
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Table 9
x c Uc w Uw 
1 :374 565:2870 :272 562:7246 4:76908%
2 :372 565:2491 :272 562:8844 4:39332%
3 :368 565:1886 :270 563:0481 3:96862%
4 :362 565:1085 :268 563:2125 3:50739%
5 :354 565:0122 :266 563:3713 3:02842%
6 :345 564:9038 :262 563:5181 2:55147%
7 :334 564:7871 :258 563:6479 2:09280%
8 :321 564:6665 :253 563:7588 1:66405%
9 :306 564:5464 :248 563:8506 1:27308%
10 :290 564:4312 :241 563:9246 0:92547%
11 :272 564:3258 :232 563:9828 0:62569%
12 :253 564:235 :222 564:0275 0:37794%
13 :232 564:1636 :211 564:0611 0:18659%
14 :209 564:1167 :196 564:0857 0:05648%
15 :184 564:0995 :179 564:1033  0:00702%
Note.  = 0:045,  = 0, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40
Figure 1
Consumption proles with and without consumption-tax nanced program
Note.  = 0:035, r = 0:035 , T = 55, T = 40, x = 10
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Figure 2
Asset accounts with and without consumption-tax nanced program
Note.  = 0:035, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40, x = 10
Figure 3
Consumption proles with and without consumption-tax nanced program
Note.  = 0:025, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40, x = 10
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Figure 4
Asset accounts with and without consumption-tax nanced program
Note.  = 0:025, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40, x = 10
Figure 5
Consumption proles with and without consumption-tax nanced program
Note.  = 0:045, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40, x = 10
40
Figure 6
Asset accounts with and without consumption-tax nanced program
Note.  = 0:045, r = 0:035, T = 55, T = 40, x = 10
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